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Abstract
Intrusion detection is an arms race; attackers evade intru-
sion detection systems by developing new attack vectors to
sidestep known defense mechanisms. Provenance provides
a detailed, structured history of the interactions of digital
objectswithin a system. It is ideal for intrusion detection, be-
cause it offers a holistic, attack-vector-agnostic view of sys-
tem execution. As such, provenance graph analysis funda-
mentally strengthens detection robustness. We discuss the
opportunities and challenges associated with provenance-
based intrusion detection and provide insights based on our
experience building such systems.
1 Introduction
System security continues to be an arms race between in-
truders and defenders. In this arms race, attackers adapt in
response to defense mechanisms and always win. Defeating
attackers requires rethinking traditional defeat- and exploit-
based mitigation techniques, which lack complete security
coverage [16]. We propose taking a holistic, attack-vector-
agnostic view of system execution.
We claim that provenance is the ideal data to use for such
a task and that provenance graph-based analysis is the ul-
timate means towards achieving complete security coverage.
Provenance refers to meta-data describing how digital ob-
jects came to be in their current state. It provides a complete,
structured view of what happened on the system [4] by pre-
senting complex dependencies and causality relationships
between digital objects as a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
As such, it is well suited for intrusion detection. An intru-
sion manifests in anomalous interdependencies among data
objects that deviate from those found in non-malicious exe-
cution. In fact, in attack causality analysis [10], provenance
has long been used to explain intrusions ( § 3).
Provenance graph analysis strengthens adversarial robust-
ness, because the graphs exhibit long-range correlations and
dependencies allowing for causal reasoning about intrusions [2]
(§ 2). Such causal reasoning enables detection of sophisti-
cated attacks, such as network attacks, that remain unde-
tected for long periods of time. In prior work [8], we reduced
a host-based intrusion detection problem to a graph-based
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anomaly detection problem, in which graph analysis iden-
tified structured execution traces that represented an intru-
sion. However, intrusion detection on provenance graphs
requires analyzing dynamic, attributed, streaming graphs,
which are rarely studied in the literature. Given the devel-
opment of fine-grained, whole-system provenance capture
systems [15], this task becomes even more challening as
the graphs rapidly become extraordinarily large [4]. How-
ever, we can use domain-specific knowledge of provenance
graphs to simplify the challenge of identifying anomalies,
making it an easier problem than general-purpose graph
analysis suggests. For example, since execution history is
immutable, we can assume that provenance graphs only in-
crease in size (i.e., there are never deletions). This property
allows us to incrementally and progressively reason about
causality without needing to look backwards.
2 Applicability
Data provenance has seen use in areas such as databases and
computational sciences. While it now also appears as part
of real-time security analysis [4], most approaches are vari-
ations of dynamic taint analysis of provenance data. While
simple and effective on their own merits, they are limited to
constraining information flows within a system (e.g., data
loss prevention, access control, and regulatory compliance);
little work has been done to detect intrusions from outside
the system [8, 15].
Host-based anomaly detection systems define some base-
line normal behavior and then classify as abnormal any be-
havior that significantly deviates from the baseline. The ap-
proach is predicated on the assumption that intrusions are
highly correlated to abnormal behavior. Many existing sys-
tems use unstructured collections of multidimensional data
(e.g., audit logs) to detect outlying points in a high-dimensional
feature space, formulating intrusion detection as point-based
outlier detection to leverage various learning and data min-
ing techniques. Provenance, however, is structured graph
data that represents relationships between a digital item (i.e.,
data entity), a transformation on that item (i.e., activity), and
agents (i.e., persons and organizations) associated with the
item and the transformation. Hence, unlike the prior work,
we formulate the host-based intrusion detection problem
as a graph-based anomaly detection problem defined as fol-
lows [2]:
TaPP’18, July 2018, London, United Kingdom Han et al.
Definition 1. The graph-based intrusion detection prob-
lem is to identify components of the graph that are signifi-
cantly different from those in a learned model of the graph.
Using a provenance graph-based approach to intrusion
detection is suitable for various reasons:
● Provenance captures complete access to security-sensitive ker-
nel objects: State-of-the-art provenance whole-system cap-
ture systems leverage the Linux Security Module (LSM) in-
terface to record provenance for every security-related in-
teraction, rather than intercepting system calls. They can
be extended to verifiably monitor all information flows in a
system [7].
● Provenance makes explicit the relationships among objects:
One powerful feature of provenance is its native graphical
representation to show system execution as interactions be-
tween data objects. However, such interdependencies are
innate to every execution trace, even in seemingly unstruc-
tured audit data from logging systems such as auditd. In
fact, there exist frameworks that reconstruct graph-based
provenance from flat audit data to allow for reasoning about
system execution [6]. However, this post hoc approach comes
with a caveat: it is harder to ensure completeness or correct-
ness of the graph built from flat audit data [17].
● Intrusions result from unexpected interactions: The entry
point to a victim system may be a single, isolated event,
but its effects must propagate for an intrusion to be fruit-
ful to an attacker. For example, consider an insider attacker
who wishes to steal sensitive information from a data server
under his control. He first installs a malicious BASH script
that discovers and collects all documents (i.e., a single entry
point to the server). However, to successfully steal the infor-
mation, he needs to either transfer it to a foreign machine
or write it to an external storage device. The key to detect-
ing the data leak is to connect the collection of the data to
the transmission of the data, which in a provenance graph
is clearly represented as a chain of dependencies between
processes, files, and sockets.
● Graph representation improves robustness: graphs are gen-
erally more adversarially robust, i.e., it is harder for an at-
tacker to camouflage her behavior to fit into the reference
graph structures [2]. In fact, we claim that the provenance
graph of an intrusion must differ from that of a valid exe-
cution when we use an LSM-based whole-system provenance
capture system. As LSM places hooks on any execution path
that generates an information flow [2], if the capture sys-
tem records provenance on every such path, violations of
security policies will be evident from the provenance graph.
Moreover, the attacker must also have the knowledge of the
substructures that are referenced by the IDS, which alone
requires significant effort. For example, the attacker from
the previous example may evade detection if each step is al-
lowed when performed in isolation. An advanced attacker
can even fake the IP address of the foreign machine. How-
ever, when considering the chain of actions as a whole (i.e.,
an abnormal graph substructure), we can identify the intru-
sion.
3 Opportunities and Challenges
Analyzing dynamic, attributed graphs is difficult. Graph anom-
aly detection in this setting requires detecting changes over
time, which in turn requires a formal notion of similarity
defined specifically for the target domain [2]. With attrib-
uted vertices and edges, changes can occur both structurally
and in labels. Provenance graphs further complicate themat-
ter as each vertex and edge usually has a set of attributes
(instead of a single type attribute), and the number of at-
tributes varies depending on the type of the vertex/edge.
To enable online intrusion detection, one also receives the
provenance graph in a streaming fashion and must perform
the analysis in realtime. However, provenance graphs are
acyclic, thus having a topological ordering that simplifies
computation. Events therefore can be partially ordered as
they are streamed for analysis [15]. We can then efficiently
reason over the vast amount of information contained in
vertex and edge labels, which, combined with structural in-
formation, reflects various aspects of system execution. In
the following sections, we discuss the main opportunities
and challenges associated with provenance-based intrusion
detection.
3.1 Opportunities
Opportunity1: Provenance graph structures and labels
encode the complete, historical context of system exe-
cution. A useful intrusion detection system learns detailed
normal behavior from the past. Given flat audit data with
no completeness guarantee, an IDS is limited by the data
recorded in the audit logs. It is also difficult to obtain higher-
order dependencies [18]. In some cases, the type of informa-
tion it learns from is determined empirically by the attack
vectors it is designed to detect. Such an ad hoc approach
ultimately leads to the arms race described in § 1. In con-
trast, whole-system provenance provides a complete view
of information flow that natively reflects higher-order cor-
relations and long-range dependencies. Its graph structure
also allows for graph-based analysis. We illustrate its bene-
fits by describing the following principles that provenance
analysis embodies.
● Principle 1: Identify semantically meaningful substructures.
Provenance graphs can become large, obfuscating impor-
tant events that require special attention. Complex system
interactions within a task and between tasks further cloud
understanding. Therefore, it is important to identify sub-
structures/subgraphs that are semantically coherent (e.g., de-
scribing a single task within a program). Macko et al. [13]
developed two centrality metrics to perform local clustering
on provenance graphs for task separation. Generic metrics
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used to discover communities are also applicable, albeit ex-
pensive in certain cases. Significant changes in those struc-
tures usually imply intrusions. For example, most control-
data attacks alter the control flow of a program to execute in-
jected malicious code. They typically start a new shell with
the privilege of the victim process [5], which inevitably in-
troduces unexpected vertices and edges in the provenance
graph. Akoglu et al. [2] summarized various distance mea-
sures to detect structural anomalies in dynamic graphs.
● Principle 2: Incorporate time. The rate of provenance event
creation is proportional to kernel object access rate. As each
access to security-sensitive kernel object results in (at least)
one edge in the graph, provenance graphs reflect this rate
through the number of vertices and/or edges per unit of
time. Although some benign workloads exhibit a high rate
of provenance generation (e.g., building a kernel [15]), bursts
of intense provenance generation frequently indicate an at-
tack. For example, attackers exploit race conditions to de-
ploy Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) attacks. The
fairly recent Dirty COW attack(CVE-2016-5195), in which
the Linux kernel’s memory subsystem incorrectly handled
copy-on-write (COW), grantingwrite access to private read-
only memory mappings, used two threads simultaneously
bombarding the system with madvise and write system
calls. These calls produce elements of the provenance graph
at a rate rarely observed during normal behavior.
● Principle 3: Keep history inmind.Advanced persistent threat
(APT) attacks are usually a set of continuous, long-running
processes that permeate the victim system. Noticing such
attacks requires a holistic understanding of system execu-
tion starting from its initialization. In fact, any intrusion
that requires retrospective analysis on previously processed
portion of the graph can be discovered only if the detec-
tion system “remembers” history. However, the sheer vol-
ume of provenance data renders any attempt at a complete
review impractical. One way to mitigate this needle-in-a-
haystack problem is to incrementally build a concise yet
comprehensive model that memorizes the historical context
of the graph. For example, Lemay et al. [11] designed regu-
lar grammars for provenance DAGs to succinctly summa-
rize the graph structure.
Opportunity 2: Provenance graphs are topologically
and partially ordered.This property follows naturally from
the fact that provenance graphs are DAGs and that they
truthfully reflect the causal relationships of events that oc-
curred on the system. We took advantage of this property
and designed a real-time provenance analysis framework
to enable semantically rich security services [8]. In particu-
lar, a vertex-centric graph framework facilitates provenance
graph analysis with its correctness guaranteed by the two
partial ordering properties: 1) once an outgoing edge to a
vertex arrives, we know that we have observed all incom-
ing edges to that vertex; 2) we receive all edges and vertices
along a path in order.
Opportunity 3: Provenance graphs enrich attack attri-
butionand sense-making.Attribution is an important fea-
ture that allows system administrators to quickly understand
the source of an intrusion so that they can remedy the is-
sue in a timely fashion and effectively control the damage.
Many intrusion detection systems suffer from a high false
positive rate. Attribution helps administrators quickly reject
false positive alarms, effectively making the IDS more us-
able. Provenance graphs are causality graphs that naturally
allow for sense-making, providing a causal chain of events
for reasoning. For example, King et al. [9] designed a system
that structures OS-level audit logs to automatically identify
sequences of steps that occurred in an intrusion, starting
from a single detection point.
3.2 Challenges
Challenge 1: It is difficult to obtain a good graph sum-
mary. From Opportunity 1 (§ 3.1), we see that a good graph
summary should at least adhere to all the principles dis-
cussed. For principles that do not consider graph structures,
we can learn trends via applications of machine learning or
empirically, e.g., by finding and setting a threshold. How-
ever, the streaming nature of provenance data for online in-
trusion detection makes graph analysis challenging. One ap-
proach is to segment the graph using a timewindow, though
one needs to determine an appropriate window size.
Challenge 2: Online intrusion detection requires effi-
cient computation. Even with the framework described in
§ 3.1, the computation itself (e.g., to generate a good graph
summary) must be efficient enough to detect an intrusion
before it wreaks havoc on the system. Many intrusion de-
tection systems require training on known datasets, which
is often performed offline [3]. Efficiency therefore is usually
a primary concern during deployment. Complicated graph
algorithms, such as subgraph isomorphism, are often NP-
complete and are suitable only for small graphs. Machine
learning and data mining approaches on graphs, e.g., graph
kernels, offer alternatives with polynomial or even linear
time complexity.
Challenge 3: The complexityof the systemmakes prove-
nance graphs difficult tounderstand.There exists a trade-
off between the completeness of provenance and the suc-
cinctness of the resulting graph. With whole-system prove-
nance capture, this trade-off becomes even clearer as a large
number of underlying system dependencies are captured.
For example, Liu et al. [12] showed that a simple sshd com-
mand can trigger amassive number of Linux commands that
are used to update Linux environment variables, which re-
sults in a large provenance subgraph describing these activ-
ities. However, they also proposed an algorithm that takes
into account factors, such as rareness and dataflow termina-
tion, to determine the priority of events during backward
and forward tracking of a provenance graph.
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4 Experience
In prior work [8], we presented a provenance-based intru-
sion detection system. As we refined our system [15], we
identified idiosyncrasies that differentiate intrustion detec-
tion via provenance and via audit logs. In addition to the
properties already discussed, provenance captures interac-
tions across applications that are invaluable in intrusion de-
tection.
Based on our prior experience, we identify the following
keys to provenance-based intrusion detection:
●Understand the provenance capturemechanism and the graph
it produces: It is important to understand what information
is captured, how it is captured, and at what level of granu-
larity. These all affect graph interpretation. For example, we
have worked with capture systems that record both thread-
level details [15] and process-only details [6]. They have fun-
damentally different underlying capture mechanisms, and
therefore, we need to make different assumptions about the
provenance graphs they generate, even when they are cap-
turing provenance of the same system execution. More im-
portantly, we need to make correct assumptions, which is
fundamental to the correctness of any provenance graph
analysis. Consequently, it is essential to specify the formal-
ization of the graphs from different capture mechanisms,
not to generalize.
Sometimes, existing provenance capture systemsmay not
fulfill the needs of an IDS; jointly developing a provenance
capture system and a provenance-based IDS is most likely
to improve the performance of both systems.
●Build datasets to benchmark IDSes: The lack of labeled datasets
is a serious obstacle to work in this area. As provenance cap-
ture mechanisms evolve, a plug-and-play system that can
automatically rerun experiments is valuable.We use Vagrant
to generate experimental data in a virtual environment [1].
However, labeling datasets is tricky [14]. One cannot simply
label an entire provenance graph as an “intrusion”, since an
IDS could mistakenly interpret a benign subgraph as an in-
trusion entry point. On the other hand, a provenance graph
of seemingly normal system execution might contain unex-
pected execution errors, which, though not part of an intru-
sion, still deviate from specified normal behavior. This dif-
ficulty leads to misleading comparison metrics, such as pre-
cision, recall, and F-measure. Benchmarking IDSes remains
an important open problem.
5 Conclusion
We propose to realize robust, attack-vector-agnostic intru-
sion detection through analysis on provenance graphs and
identify opportunities and challenges specific towhole-system,
provenance-based intrusion detection. While the concept of
OS-level provenance is almost a decade old, formalization
and theoretical studies of its graphs have not yet materi-
alized. Applying whole-system provenance to intrusion de-
tection [8] requires a formal understanding of provenance.
We invite fellow researchers in both theory and provenance
communities to continue this exploration with us.
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